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Abstract
Building on the models of sticky information, we endogenize the prob-
ability of obtaining new information by introducing a switching mech-
anism allowing agents to choose between costly rational expectations
and costless expectations under sticky information. Thereby, the share
of agents with rational expectations becomes endogenous and time-
varying. While central results of sticky information models are re-
tained, we ﬁnd that the share of rational expectations is positively
correlated with the variance of the variable forecasted, providing a
link to models of near-rationality. Output expectations in our model
are generally more rational than inﬂation expectations, but the share
of rational inﬂation expectations increases with a rising variance of the
interest rate. With regard to optimal monetary policy, we ﬁnd that
the Taylor principle provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
the determinacy of the model. However, output and inﬂation stability
are optimized if the central bank does not react too strongly to in-
ﬂation, but rather also targets the output gap with a relatively large
coeﬃcient in the Taylor rule.
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1 Introduction
The empirical observation that households’ inﬂation and output expectations
are not always rational1, on the one hand, and that New Keynesian Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models with sticky prices are not
able to reproduce the inertia and delayed responses to shocks observed in
actual inﬂation and output data, on the other hand, has triggered several
alternative approaches. Among these are the sticky information models by
Mankiw and Reis (2001, 2002, 2003, 2007), learning models (e.g. Evans and
Honkapohja, 2001, 2003), approaches in behavioral economics and models
of near-rationality (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Laibson, 1997 and
Akerlof et al., 2000) as well as models with heterogeneous expectations and
heuristics such as Branch and McGough (2004) and De Grauwe (2008).
In the sticky information model by Mankiw and Reis (2001, 2002, 2003,
2007) it is assumed that all agents know the relevant model of the econ-
omy (in contrast to assuming that agents follow simple heuristics as in, e.g.,
De Grauwe, 2008), while the costs of acquiring and processing information
cause some agents to use old information sets, resulting in so-called sticky
information. Thus, only agents obtaining the current information are able to
form rational expectations, while those who do not update receive informa-
tion gradually as news spread through the economy. This type of costless and
eﬀortless information acquisition can be thought of as obtained by observing
other agents’ behavior or by chance, for example through the media, as in
the epidemiology model of Carroll (2001, 2003).
Sticky information models in Mankiw and Reis (2001, 2002, 2003, 2007)
take the probability of updating to the most recent information set, λ, as
an exogenous parameter. Hence, all agents face the same probability of
updating their information set and this probability stays constant over time.
Building on their approach, we analyze a sticky information DSGE model
with heterogeneous expectations and an endogenous and time-varying share
of agents with rational expectations, λt: Agents of type 1 have rational
expectations, while agents of type 2 are subject to sticky information and thus
1See, for example, Thomas (1999) and Mankiw et al. (2003) for a survey.
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form expectations using an outdated information set. Since new information
is costly due to acquisition and processing costs, in our model agents face a
trade-oﬀ between the accuracy of their forecasts and a ﬁxed ‘rationality cost’
for obtaining the most up-to-date information.
Introducing a switching mechanism derived in a seminal paper by Brock
and Hommes (1997), agents switch to being rational once the losses from
sticky information become too high. Thereby, the share of agents that up-
date information each period, λt, becomes endogenous and time-varying.
Empirical evidence of pervasive heterogeneity in inﬂation expectations and
switching between models of expectation formation is given by Pfajfar and
Zakelj (2009) and Pfajfar and Santoro (2008), who ﬁnd evidence that agents
form either rational, sticky or static expectations (analyzing the distribution
of the Michigan survey of households for the US) and that they switch models
frequently in an experimental setting. In a similar vein, Maag (2010) eval-
uates heterogeneity in quantitative households’ expectations data from the
Swedish Consumer Tendency Survey. Estimating a Gaussian mixture model
of underlying distribution densities, the author ﬁnds that a large share of
households form static expectations based on their perception of actual in-
ﬂation, while smaller shares form rational, adaptive and static expectations
based on oﬃcial inﬂation rates, respectively.
Simulating our model, we ﬁnd considerable time-variation in λt once the
rationality cost exceeds a certain level. Agents seem to be more rational
with respect to output than to inﬂation expectations, which could be due to
the higher coeﬃcient on inﬂation in the Taylor rule, causing households to
confer rationality upon the central bank. Furthermore, the share of rational
expectations is positively correlated with the variance of the variable to be
forecasted: Agents are willing to pay the cost for up-to-date information if
changes in the variable are relatively large and remain inattentive otherwise.
This is a central result of models with near-rationality of agents by, e.g.,
Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and Akerlof et al. (1996, 2000). In addition, we
ﬁnd that the share of rational inﬂation expectations rises with an increase in
the variance of the nominal interest rate: Agents choose to pay more attention
to inﬂation when monetary policy becomes more active. This result is also in
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line with near-rationality and emphasizes the strong link between monetary
policy and inﬂation expectations.
With regard to monetary policy, important results of sticky information
models in Mankiw and Reis (2002, 2007) are reproduced by our model with
endogenous and time-varying λt: We also ﬁnd a hump-shaped response of
inﬂation to a monetary policy shock and that determinacy depends only on
the reaction coeﬃcient to inﬂation in the Taylor rule, as pointed out by
Meyer-Gohde (2009b). Analysis of second moments and impulse-response
functions shows, however, that optimal monetary policy should not put too
much weight on inﬂation (as long as the Taylor principle is fulﬁlled). A
relatively large weight on the output gap minimizes ﬂuctuations of output
in response to monetary policy and cost-push shocks, while inﬂation is only
marginally aﬀected. However, this comes at the risk of overreacting to a
positive demand shock, which then produces a small recession in output as
monetary policy is tightened overly strictly.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a short overview of
the related literature on sticky information and models with heterogeneous
expectations, section 3 derives the model, while section 4 presents simulation
results and policy analysis. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Literature Review
While DSGE models assume sticky prices with Calvo (1983) pricing, Mankiw
and Reis (2001, 2002, 2003, 2007) apply the Calvo mechanism to the arrival
of new information, so that agents underly an exogenous probability each pe-
riod that they will not be able to update their information set. Thereby, al-
though the rational expectations hypothesis is retained, agents are restricted
in the sense that new information is distributed slowly throughout the econ-
omy. As a result, macroeconomic relations are governed by an inﬁnite sum
of lagged expectations, resulting in hump-shaped impulse-responses of inﬂa-
tion and output to shocks and a signiﬁcantly higher degree of inertia in the
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variables.2 Microfoundations for the sticky information model are derived
by Reis (2006a,b), where both consumers and ﬁrms rationally choose to only
sporadically update their information due to the costs related to acquiring
and processing information. However, and although Reis derives the optimal
length of inattentiveness for both ﬁrms and consumers, in the aggregate the
probability of updating is given exogenously for all agents. To our knowl-
edge, so far Branch et al. (2009) present the only attempt to fully endogenize
the degree of inattentiveness in a sticky information model. Building on the
model in Ball et al. (2005), ﬁrms choose their degree of inattentiveness by
minimizing a quadratic loss function comparing the ﬁrm-speciﬁc price given
the ﬁrm-speciﬁc λ to the optimal price given some ﬁxed economy-wide prob-
ability of updating information λ. The authors furthermore introduce a cost
to information gathering that is deﬁned relative to λ2. However, contrary to
our approach the rate of information updating is not time-varying, so that
agents solve the optimization problem only once. This is not satisfactory in
our view, as agents react to shocks that occur over time.
A diﬀerent explanation for deviations from rational expectations is given
in the models of near-rationality by Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and Akerlof
et al. (2000). The authors deﬁne near-rationality as "non-maximizing behav-
ior in which the gains from maximizing rather than nonmaximizing are small
in a well-deﬁned sense" (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985, pp. 823 - 824), meaning
that losses from near-rationality are only second-order in terms of the devi-
ation from the long-run equilibrium, but may nevertheless cause ﬁrst-order
changes in real activity. Building on ﬁndings in psychology and behavioral
economics that agents are often not fully maximizing agents and employ
simplifying mechanisms such as editing, mental framing or heuristics, Ak-
erlof et al. (2000) derive a model of near-rational wage and price setting. In
their model, both ﬁrms and workers may ignore a fraction (or all) of inﬂation,
if levels of inﬂation are low, as costs from fully maximizing do not match the
gains in proﬁts or wages they produce.
2Several studies have compared models with sticky prices and sticky information. While
Trabandt (2007) claims that the hybrid New Keynesian model with sticky prices and habit
formation can outperform the sticky information model, Dupor et al. (2006) ﬁnd evidence
for both sticky prices and sticky information in aggregate US data.
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A growing literature models deviations from rationality by incorporat-
ing heterogeneous expectations into DSGE and also overlapping-generations
(OLG) models: Nunes (2009), Guse (2005), Berardi and Duﬀy (2007) and
Berardi (2009) study the impact of non-rational expectations under recursive
least-squares learning in the spirit of Evans and Honkapohja (2001, 2003).
Analyzing stability of a model where agents either estimate the mean or an
AR(1) process of the series to be forecasted, Guse (2005) ﬁnds that stabil-
ity can switch between the fundamental and the AR(1) solution as the level
of heterogeneity in expectations varies. While Nunes (2009) incorporates a
fraction of learners into an otherwise standard New Keynesian DSGE model
to explain the hump-shaped behavior of inﬂation, Berardi and Duﬀy (2007)
evaluate the role of central bank transparency in a DSGE with private sec-
tor learning. Similarly, Berardi (2009) analyzes optimal monetary policy in
a model with heterogeneous expectations, where a fraction of agents makes
forecasts using an underparameterized model. Comparing equilibria under
various Taylor rules, the author ﬁnds that stability is not guaranteed if the
central bank responds only to learners’ expectations using the underparame-
terized model. Furthermore, welfare outcomes are optimal if monetary policy
responds only to rational learners rather than to heterogeneous expectations
due to a stronger reaction of rational expectations to shocks in the economy
and a more favorable trade-oﬀ between the output gap and inﬂation vari-
ability. Woodford (2005) also evaluates optimal monetary policy in the case
of near-rational private sector expectations, deﬁned as unspeciﬁed deviations
from the central bank’s expectations. He ﬁnds that commitment and history-
dependence of optimal policy become even more important with uncertainty
about agents’ expectations than when assuming rational expectations.
Another strand of the literature explains the eﬀect of heterogeneous ex-
pectations when a fraction of agents follows simple heuristics. An earlier
contribution is Branch and McGough (2004), who analyze a DSGE model
with rational and non-rational expectations, where non-rational agents fol-
low a simple adaptive or trend-extrapolating rule. The authors formulate a
heterogeneous expectations equilibrium and ﬁnd that determinacy and sta-
bility of the model depend on the weight of non-rational expectations in
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the aggregate expectations operator and on the type of heuristic that non-
rational agents follow. Branch and McGough (2009) derive microfoundations
for the DSGE with heterogeneous expectations analyzed in Branch and Mc-
Gough (2004) and give axioms that are necessary in order to be able to derive
an aggregate expectations operator in the form of a convex combination of
heterogeneous expectations. In a similar model, Geiger and Sauter (2009)
evaluate the eﬀect of heterogeneous inﬂation expectations on optimal mon-
etary policy. In contrast to Evans and Honkapohja (2003), they ﬁnd that a
traditional Taylor rule reacting to actual values of inﬂation and the output
gap works best, as the presence of heterogeneous expectations helps to sta-
bilize the economy so that a forward-looking Taylor rule would only be the
best choice if all agents had rational expectations.
Whereas in the studies cited above the proportions of rational and non-
rational agents are given exogenously, Brock and Hommes (1997) introduce
a mechanism, whereby agents evaluate the performance of their forecast and
switch to alternative prediction rules if their expectations deviate too much
from current values. The authors use the mechanism to model the choice be-
tween rational expectations, that come at a positive cost, and non-rational
expectations, that are costless, but imperfect. Branch and Evans (2006,
2007, 2009) use a similar mechanism to the one proposed by Brock and
Hommes (1997) to explain switching between predictors in a model where
agents are restricted to choose between diﬀerent underparameterized mod-
els to obtain forecasts. In the spirit of learning models such as Evans and
Honkapohja (2001, 2003), the authors argue that bounded rationality can
lead to misspeciﬁcation in the form of over-simplistic models, even when
agents are rational in the sense that they learn the consistent parameters of
the misspeciﬁed model. As a result, the authors ﬁnd that multiple equilibria
may exist even when the rational expectations equilibrium would lead to a
unique and stable equilibrium. Volatility in output and inﬂation is generated
endogenously in the model, but the authors ﬁnd that a monetary policy re-
acting increasingly to households inﬂation expectations can reduce inﬂation
volatility. A further approach using Brock and Hommes (1997)’s switch-
ing mechanism is presented by De Grauwe (2008) who analyzes switching
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between simple heuristics regarding output and inﬂation expectations in a
DSGE model without rational expectations. He ﬁnds that waves of optimism
and pessimism regarding output can generate endogenous business cycles and
a proportion of trend-extrapolators of inﬂation causes endogenous inertia in
the simulated inﬂation series. Brazier et al. (2008) allow for switching be-
tween adaptive and rational expectations of inﬂation in an OLG model and
ﬁnd that monetary policy should account for expected inﬂation in order to
stabilize the economy. Even then, endogenous switching between heuristics
causes endogenous volatility in the inﬂation rate, which can, however, be re-
duced when an inﬂation target heuristic is introduced successfully. Similarly,
Brock and de Fontnouvelle (2000) analyze an OLG model with heterogeneous
inﬂation expectations and endogenous switching between heuristics. Letting
the number of possible predictors tend to inﬁnity, the authors ﬁnd that the
model is asymptotically stable if the mean of the distribution of predictors
is low, but becomes unstable for a high mean expected inﬂation.
3 The Model
3.1 Heterogeneous Expectations
We assume there exist two types of agents:
1. Agent 1 has rational expectations: ERE
t = Et




Agents of type 2 thus deviate from rational expectations in the sense that
they know the relevant model and are computationally able to compute ra-
tional forecasts, but do not have access to the most recent information set.
Note that agents forecasting with sticky information use outdated informa-
tion from all past periods up to t-1, where expectations receive less weight,
the further they lie in the past, i.e. the longer a particular agent has not up-
dated his information set. The expectations operator for agents with sticky
information, ESI
t , is hence a weighted aggregate of all agents that use infor-
mation sets older than the current one. The weighting parameter λ can be
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interpreted as the average share of agents with rational expectations and is
assumed to be constant over time. An agent that decides to pay the ratio-
nality cost, will belong to group 1 as long as he pays the cost each period,
and becomes an agent of type 2 if he does not update his information set in
a certain period.
The aggregate heterogeneous expectations index is then deﬁned as follows:
e Et ≡ λtERE
t + (1 − λt)ESI
t = λtEt + (1 − λt)λ
P∞
j=0(1 − λ)jEt−1−j, where
λt is the endogenous share of rational agents in period t, the time-varying
analogue to the probability that agents may update their information set,
which was given exogenously in the sticky information model. We assume
that agents solve the model before deciding between expectations operators.
Thus, the model equations can be derived setting λt = λ, as the switching
mechanism operates after equilibrium values are found.
Furthermore, we assume that the axioms in Branch and Evans (2009)
necessary for aggregation of heterogeneous expectations hold. Thus, standard
mathematical operations with expectations operators, like the law of iterated
expectations, are assumed to hold also across heterogeneous expectations.
Also, second-order interactions between diﬀerent expectations operators are
ruled out, agents are assumed to correctly forecast variables’ steady states
and in the limit, all agents have rational expectations.
3.2 Households’ Problem
The model follows a standard New Keynesian set-up, see for instance Walsh
(2003) and Mankiw and Reis (2007), but includes heterogeneous expectations
E
j
t: The model economy is populated by a large number of inﬁnitely-lived
households, that diﬀer only with respect to the expectations operator used,
but otherwise have identical preferences and endowments. Households of


































(abstracting from money, capital and the government), where the composite
consumption good, Ct and the aggregate price index Pt are deﬁned as Dixit-
Stiglitz aggregators of individual consumption goods ct,i produced by ﬁrm i




















From the ﬁrst-order conditions we get the log-linearized Euler equation:





(ˆ it − E
j
tπt+1), (5)
where variables with a hat denote deviations from steady state. We thus get
the standard log-linearized Euler equation for each agent j, where individ-
ual deviations of consumption from its steady state diﬀers according to the
expectations operator employed.
Aggregation of the Euler equation in (5) across households makes use
of the axioms in Branch and Evans (2009), especially the assumption that
the law of iterated expectations holds across heterogeneous expectations and
that agents have identical expectations in the limit. Iterating forward and
aggregating across agents gives, after some algebra:3
ˆ ct = e Etˆ ct+1 −
1
σ
e Et(ˆ it − πt+1), (6)
where e Et = λtERE
t + (1 − λt)ESI
t = λtEt + (1 − λt)λ
P∞
j=0 (1 − λ)jEt−1−j.
Note that agents under sticky information do not necessarily use the same
expectations operator, since the set of agents with sticky information can
include any lagged information set up to minus inﬁnity.
3For a detailed derivation, see the mathematical appendix.
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To arrive at the New Keynesian IS-relation, recall that without invest-
ment, government and net exports ˆ yt = ˆ ct + ut,4 where we deﬁne ut as an
i.i.d. demand shock. We thus get for the New Keynesian IS curve:
ˆ yt = e Etˆ yt+1 −
1
σ
(ˆ it − e Etπt+1) + ut, (7)
which gives, when spelling out heterogeneous expectations included in e Et:





















ˆ it + ut (8)
As in the standard sticky information model, we thus ﬁnd that the IS-
relation contains an inﬁnite sum of past expectations on steady-state output
and inﬂation, reﬂecting the fact that a fraction of agents use outdated in-
formation sets for forecasting. However, here the fractions of households in
each group are determined endogenously by the switching mechanism given
below.
3.3 Firms’ Problem
Next, we model ﬁrms’ behavior. Again, we assume a large number of ﬁrms,
that produce individual consumption goods, which together form the com-
posite consumption basket. We also assume that ﬁrms are owned by house-
holds and are thus subject to the same heterogeneity in expectations faced
by households.5
In line with the standard New Keynesian model, we assume a Cobb-
Douglas production function with constant returns to scale:
yt,i = ZtNt,i, (9)
4Problems and implications of this approach are discussed in Groessl (2008).
5This is in contrast to Mankiw and Reis (2007) who assume that households and ﬁrms
are subject to diﬀerent probabilities of updating their information set.
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where Zt denotes technology (equal for all ﬁrms) and Nt,i is the amount of
labour used by ﬁrm i to produce yt,i. Since we assume market clearing, we
can set Yt = Ct, ignoring government consumption and net exports. Finally,
from the cost minimization problem of households, we have for the demand
of goods produced by ﬁrm i of household j:






Again, we will assume that the axioms from Branch and McGough (2009)
hold. In line with the framework applied in the sticky information models,
we assume that ﬁrms set optimal prices each period, hence the only rigidity
in the model applies to the stickiness in information. Firms maximize proﬁts
























Inserting the constraints and log-linearizing gives for the deviation of the





t [ˆ pt + ˆ ϕt] (14)
where ˆ ϕt is the deviation from steady state of real marginal costs deﬁned
as ϕt ≡ (Wt/Pt)Z
−1
t . In order to express the optimal price in terms of the
output gap rather than real marginal costs, we follow Ball et al. (2005) and
get for the aggregate price index:6
6For a detailed derivation, see the mathematical appendix.
11Discussion Paper L.Dräger
ˆ pt = λtE
RE
t [ˆ pt + ψ (ˆ yt − ˆ y
n
t ) + et] + (1 − λt)E
SI
t [ˆ pt + ψ (ˆ yt − ˆ y
n
t ) + et]
= e Et [ˆ pt + ψ (ˆ yt − ˆ y
n
t ) + et] (15)
where ψ =
σ+η
1+ηθ, ˆ yn is the natural output under ﬂexible prices and full infor-
mation and et is an i.i.d. cost-push shock. Finally, lagging equation (15) by















jEt−1−j [πt + ψ∆(ˆ yt − ˆ y
n
t ) + ∆et]
(16)
In order to derive the sticky-information Phillips curve with heteroge-
neous expectations, we then allow agents to choose between expectations










et + λt−1Et−1 [πt + ψ∆(ˆ yt − ˆ y
n
t ) + ∆et]




jEt−2−j [πt + ψ∆(ˆ yt − ˆ y
n
t ) + ∆et]
(17)
Introducing the time-varying share of rational agents, λt−1, hence causes
inﬂation rates to be inﬂuenced by a moving average of past shares of rational,
i.e. inattentive, agents. As before, when inserting heterogeneous expectation
formation, we see that due to the fraction of agents under sticky information,
7For a detailed derivation, see the mathematical appendix.
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an inﬁnite sum of past expectations features also in the Phillips curve with
ﬂexible prices.
3.4 Monetary Policy Rule
As usual in the New Keynesian DSGE framework, our model is closed by
deﬁning a monetary policy rule. In line with the sticky information DSGE
model in Mankiw and Reis (2007), we assume a Taylor rule with interest rate
smoothing, targeting actual values of inﬂation and the output gap:
ˆ it = µiˆ it−1 + (1 − µi)(µππt + µygap(ˆ yt − ˆ y
n
t )) + ηt, (18)
where ηt is an i.i.d. shock to monetary policy. Note that we assume the
central bank to be rational with respect to current values of inﬂation and
the output gap, while at the same time accounting for the heterogeneity in
agents’ expectations implicitly contained in realized values of inﬂation and
the output gap.
3.5 Switching Mechanism
Finally, we introduce an endogenous switching mechanism, which allows
agents to choose between full and sticky information. Note that the mecha-
nism applies to both households and ﬁrms, as we assume that ﬁrms are owned
by households, and that it governs the expectations of both inﬂation and ex-
cess demand. We follow the mechanism developed by Brock and Hommes
(1997) that has also been employed, for instance, in De Grauwe (2008) and
Brazier et al. (2008).8
Agents are confronted with a choice problem of the following kind: On the
one hand, they face a positive cost of acquiring and processing information
necessary in order to form rational forecasts, which we deﬁne as ‘rationality
cost’. On the other hand, they have the prospect of gaining in consump-
8Note that we do not face a problem of chaotic dynamics and multiple equilibria here,
as in Brock and Hommes (1997), since we assume that the model is solved ﬁrst and agents
consequently decide between models of expectations. This rules out feedback eﬀects from
agents’ switching behavior to the equilibrium.
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tion and proﬁts if the rational forecast produces a more accurate solution
to the utility and proﬁt optimization problems than forecasts under sticky
information. The reverse argument applies to choices regarding sticky infor-
mation, where we assume that there is no cost of obtaining past information.
Agents’ choice problem thus relates to the literature on ‘rational inattention’
founded by Sims (2003), which analyzes rational deviations from full informa-
tion due to limited information processing capacities. However, in contrast
to Sims (2003) we assume that it is possible for agents to attain rationality
once they are willing to pay the cost for it. Deriving microfoundations for
the sticky information model, Reis (2006a,b) computes the optimal length
of inattentiveness for households and ﬁrms and ﬁnds that it falls with the
volatility of income shocks and the diﬀerence between proﬁts under full or
limited information, but increases with the costs of updating consumption
and production plans. In that sense, the microeconomic sticky information
model already incorporates the choice problem introduced here. However,
it plays no role in the macroeconomic model, where it is assumed that all
agents face the same exogenous probability of updating their information set
each period, modelled as a kind of Calvo mechanism.
Applying aspects of discrete choice theory to analyze how agents choose
between rational and sticky information expectations, we assume that agents
continuously evaluate their past forecast performance against current data.
As in Brock and Hommes (1997), agents measure the accuracy of their ex-

























where equation (19) gives forecast performance of rational expectations and
(20) that of expectations under sticky information, respectively. Each pe-
riod, agents evaluate the forecast performance of their current expectations
operator against the realizations of the forecasted variable in that period,
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which recursively adds up to the sum of all forecast errors. Note that only
rational agents face the positive rationality cost KRE of obtaining up-to-date
information. The weights ωk are assumed to be geometrically declining and
sum to one, deﬁned as ωk = (1 − ρ)ρk, with 0 < ρ < 1 measuring the degree
of agents’ memory of past mean squared forecast errors.
Solving backwards we get, after some algebra, for the forecast perfor-





t−1 − (1 − ρ)
￿















It can thus be seen that this period’s forecast performance of a particular
process for expectation formation is a weighted average of its squared forecast
error this period and last period’s forecast performance, incorporating mean
squared forecast errors of previous periods. As ρ approaches zero in the limit,
agents’ memory becomes shorter and the forecast performance is solely based
on this period’s squared forecast error. Conversely, as ρ converges towards
one, agents put more weight on the forecast performance of previous periods
and tend to ignore the most recent squared forecast error.
Finally, following Brock and Hommes (1997), the probability that agents






t ) + exp(γUSI
t )
. (23)
Consequently, the probability that agents forecast with sticky information
equals:




t ) + exp(γUSI
t )
, (24)
9For a detailed derivation, see the mathematical appendix.
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where the parameter γ measures the so-called ‘intensity of choice’, that is the
degree to which agents let their choice of an expectations rule be inﬂuenced
by its past forecasting performance. We thus model the proportion of rational
agents as a function of the relative utility from being rational compared to
overall utility levels under both rational and sticky information. As long as
the rationality costs outweigh the gains from the relatively higher accuracy of
rational forecasts, more agents will choose to forecast with old information.
But, as rationality becomes more important, for example due to higher levels
or a higher volatility of inﬂation, the gains from rationality increase and more
agents will choose to be fully rational.
Since in our model agents form expectations both on future inﬂation
and future output (i.e. the output gap), we need to deﬁne two separate
switching mechanisms, where agents evaluate the accuracy of the inﬂation
and output forecasts under rational and sticky information, respectively, so
that ˆ xt in equations (21) and (22) is replaced with ˆ yt and πt, respectively.

















π,t ) + exp(γUSI
π,t)
. (26)
Distinguishing between heterogeneous expectations regarding output and
inﬂation, we then obtain for the IS curve and the Phillips curve:







































t−1ψEt−1 (∆(ˆ yt − ˆ y
n
t ) + ∆et) + λ
π
t−1Et−1πt

















Et−2−j (ψ∆(ˆ yt − ˆ y
n




The model is solved numerically using the algorithm from Meyer-Gohde
(2009a), which accounts for the inﬁnite sum of lagged expectations included
in sticky information models by calculating matrices of limiting coeﬃcients
as the sum approaches minus inﬁnity. Simulations are carried out over 1500
periods, where the ﬁrst 500 periods are used to initialize the model and gen-
erate lagged expectations and are then dropped. Calibrated parameters are
taken from McCallum (2001) for the baseline model and shown in Table A1
in the appendix. The parameters η and θ are not included in McCallum
(2001)’s model, we set values to obtain a value for the elasticity of inﬂa-
tion with respect to the output gap similar to the one estimated by Mankiw
and Reis (2007). Furthermore and in line with De Grauwe (2008), we set
the standard deviation of the demand and cost-push shocks in the IS and
Phillips curve equal to each other.10
10Of course there exist numerous calibration approaches to DSGE models such as ours.
As a robustness check, we compared impulse-response functions and simulated series for
the share of rational agents from our baseline model to models with parameters from
Mankiw and Reis (2007) and De Grauwe (2008). Allowing for autocorrelation of the shocks
as in Mankiw and Reis (2007) or for lagged endogenous variables as in De Grauwe (2008)
considerably increases the persistence of the simulated series and the impulse-responses.
Otherwise, our results remain robust. The simulations with alternative calibrations are
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The switching parameter γ in equations (25) and (26) is set to 10000 as
in Brock and Hommes (1997) and agents’ degree of memory of past forecast
errors ρ in equations (21) and (22) is taken to be 0.5 as in De Grauwe (2008).11
We set initial values of λt for both inﬂation and output expectations to 0.5.
The rationality cost is deﬁned relative to the mean squared forecast error
of expectations under sticky information. Simulating the model over 1000
periods, assuming no costs of rationality and no persistence in forecast errors,
we obtain mean values of USI
y,t and USI
π,t. Parameters of KRE
y and KRE
π then
range from 0% - 100% of the mean forecast error under sticky information,
see Table (A2) in the Appendix. We take the value of KRE
y/π,t = 50% of USI
y/π,t
as the baseline cost.
4.2 Simulation Results and Impulse-Response Functions
Second moments and ﬁrst-order serial correlation coeﬃcients of inﬂation,
output and nominal interest rate series simulated with the McCallum (2001)
calibration are presented in Table 1 for varying rationality costs. All values
were obtained by simulating the model 1000 times over 1000 periods.
While the standard variation of the simulated series generally does not
vary with increasing rationality costs, the degree of persistence in the series
seems to increase with higher costs (and decreases again slightly at costs
of KRE = 100% for πt and ˆ it). This is in line with the intuition that as
rationality costs rise, a higher share of agents will opt for using outdated
information for their forecast, thereby increasing the endogenous persistence
of output and inﬂation, and consequently the interest rate. Nevertheless, the
persistence of the simulated series for output and inﬂation cannot match the
high degree of autocorrelation found in empirical data. In the case of inﬂa-
tion, the model even suggests a negative correlation coeﬃcient. This problem
often encountered in standard DSGE models is due to the fact that no au-
available from the author upon request.
11We checked for robustness of our results with values of γ and ρ ranging between
0 ≤ γ ≤ 15000 and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. As expected, switching becomes more frequent, the higher
the value of γ and the lower the value of ρ, respectively. Nevertheless, overall our results
remain robust also for high and low values of both γ and ρ. Results are available from the
author upon request.
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tocorrelation in the shocks was assumed as, e.g. in the sticky information
DSGE of Mankiw and Reis (2007) and, apart from the coeﬃcient of interest
rate smoothing, no lagged endogenous variables were included as in, e.g. the
De Grauwe (2008) model. Hence, sticky information by itself is not able to
produce the inertia necessary to reproduce empirical properties of inﬂation
and output data.
< Table 1 here >
Figures 1 - 4 show impulse-response functions of inﬂation, output and
the nominal interest rate to a one-standard-deviation demand shock in the
IS curve, a cost-push shock in the Phillips curve, a monetary policy shock
and a technology shock. As expected, the interest rate increases after a
positive demand shock and then returns slowly to its steady state. Inﬂation
also increases after a demand shock and undershoots before returning to its
steady state value, which is due to the fact that ﬁrms target prices and not
inﬂation.
< Figure 1 here >
A positive cost-push shock causes interest rates to rise while simulta-
neously dampening output, leading to a persistent recession and negative
deviations of inﬂation from its steady state from the second quarter after the
shock onwards.
< Figure 2 here >
The impulse-response functions of a one-standard-deviation rise in the
interest rate shown in Figure 3 show the typical hump-shaped response of
inﬂation obtained from sticky information Phillips curves, e.g. in Mankiw
and Reis (2002, 2006, 2007): A positive shock to the nominal interest rate
has a gradually dampening eﬀect on inﬂation, which continues to hold until
two years after the shock, when all series have returned to their steady states.
Hence, one important feature of the sticky information models is retained also
with heterogeneous expectations. The impulse-response function of output
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to a monetary shock also shows considerable persistence, albeit without a
hump-shaped pattern. This is due to the fact that our IS curve deviates
from the one derived in Mankiw and Reis (2007) in that it includes past
expectations of future, instead of present, inﬂation and output.
< Figure 3 here >
Finally, a positive technology shock has a pronounced boosting eﬀect on
output, which is due to the autocorrelation assumed in the shock. Both
inﬂation and the interest rate are reduced in response to the shock, leading
to the long-lasting boom in output.
< Figure 4 here >
4.3 Time-varying Shares of Rational Expectations
4.3.1 Rational Expectations with Varying Rationality Costs
After evaluating the dynamics of the simulated variables in the model, we
turn to analyzing the dynamics of the time-varying shares of rational inﬂa-
tion and output expectations. From Table 2 we see that the shares of agents
with rational output expectations, λ
y
t, and with rational inﬂation expecta-
tions, λπ
t , only ﬂuctuate between zero and one if the rationality cost is at
least 25% of the mean squared forecast error under sticky information. Even
then, on average as much as 80% and 73%, respectively, of all agents have
rational output and inﬂation expectations. Hence, even when the costs for
new information are relatively high, a large proportion of agents will prefer
to be rational. As the rationality cost increases to 50% of the mean squared
forecast error and higher, on average the share of rational agents approaches
zero. Nevertheless, even if new information is costless, so that on average
close to every agent will be rational, there may occur shocks such that be-
tween one third and one half of the population chooses to ignore the new
information, at least for short periods of time.
< Table 2 here >
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With regard to the standard deviation of the shares of rational agents, for
both output and inﬂation expectations variability is highest at medium costs
of 50%. This implies that at this cost, agents have no predetermined prefer-
ence for either rational expectations or those under sticky information, but
rather switch to their preferred expectations operator depending on current
shocks to the economy. At lower costs, the advantages of rational expecta-
tions generally outweigh the costs. Conversely, at higher costs the gains in
utility and proﬁts from rational forecasts can generally not make up for the
high costs of new information.
Interestingly, whereas the variability between rational and sticky expecta-
tions is approximately equal for output and inﬂation expectations, on average
agents seem to be more rational with respect to output expectations than to
inﬂation expectations: At costs of 50% of the mean squared forecast error, on
average 50% of agents choose to forecast with rational expectations regarding
output, but only 34% form rational inﬂation expectations. The diﬀerence is
highest at medium costs and decreases with costs falling to 0% or rising to
100%. It thus seems that agents are more concerned about obtaining new
information on changes in output than on inﬂation. This could be explained
by the relatively larger weight of inﬂation compared to the output gap in the
central bank’s Taylor rule.12 Hence, if monetary policy convincingly targets
inﬂation, agents feel that they can aﬀord to delegate rationality to the central
bank by paying less attention to current shocks on inﬂation.13
Furthermore, we analyze the average cycle length of λ
y
t and λπ
t , that is
the average number of periods in which agents use their forecasting rule
12Our ﬁnding is robust also with a high weight on the output gap relative to inﬂation in




t converge, and vice versa. Nevertheless, in order to guarantee determinacy,
the central bank has to react more than one-to-one to changes in inﬂation, which might
be enough for agents to concentrate more on information regarding recent developments
in output.
13For example, Bryan and Palmqvist (2005) analyze survey data of households’ inﬂation
expectations for Sweden and the US, and report that the introduction of the Swedish inﬂa-
tion target of 2% signiﬁcantly increased the proportion of Swedish households who ignore
inﬂation in the recent period of low inﬂation rates. Conversely, even though inﬂation was
very similar in the US, this eﬀect is not evident in American households’ inﬂation expec-
tations, suggesting an important role of central bank communication for the formation of
inﬂation expectations.
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before switching to an alternative rule. We deﬁne cylces of rationality and
non-rationality, respectively, where simulated values of λt belong to the same
cycle if they deviate from the previous period’s value by not more than a tol-
erance parameter of 0.001. For both λ
y
t and λπ
t swichting is most frequent at
a medium cost of 50%, where on average agents switch rules for output fore-
casting every three quarters and for inﬂation forecasting every four quarters.
Generally, the switching frequency increases as the rationality cost rises from
0 to 50%, and then decreases again as it further rises to 100%. Especially
at very high costs of 100% of the mean squared forecast error agents seem
very reluctant to switch forecasting rules and keep rules for an average of 11
and 21 quarters, respectively. Comparing the shares of agents with rational
output and inﬂation expectations, our model suggests that for rationality
costs of 50% and higher there is considerably more switching of forecasting
rules for output than for inﬂation, while at lower costs switching frequencies
are relatively similar. Again, this indicates a possible link between inﬂation
targeting by the central bank and the rationality of inﬂation expectations:
At a noticeable cost for rational expectations, agents feel a stronger need
to adjust output expectations and switch inﬂation forecasting rules less fre-
quently, since they know via the Taylor rule that the central bank will pay
more attention to stabilizing inﬂation than output.
4.3.2 Rational Expectations and the Volatility of Inﬂation and
Output
After analyzing the time-varying shares of rational and sticky expectations
with increasing rationality costs, it remains to evaluate which macroeconomic
conditions foster rational expectations. There exists a large literature on the
question of disagreement among forecasters and its relation to the level and
the volatility of inﬂation and output. To mention just a few, Mankiw et al.
(2003) analyze disagreement in inﬂation expectations for the US and ﬁnd
that the sticky information model is well suited to explain the degree of
heterogeneity in forecasts. Similarly, Carroll (2001, 2003) proposes micro-
foundations for the sticky information model in an ‘epidemiology model’ for
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inﬂation expectations, where agents obtain news on inﬂation via the me-
dia. The speed of arrival of news relates to both the level and the volatility
of inﬂation, since we can assume a higher media coverage on inﬂation in
times of high inﬂation rates or shocks to inﬂation. While Carroll tests his
model empirically for households’ inﬂation expectations in the US, Maag and
Lamla (2009) investigate data for Germany and ﬁnd supportive evidence of
Carroll’s model. Capistran and Timmermann (2009) also ﬁnd that hetero-
geneity in inﬂation expectations diﬀers systematically with both the level
and the variance of inﬂation. With respect to ﬁrms’ expectations regarding
the future business outlook, Lamla et al. (2007) provide evidence that ﬁrms
react strongly to aggregate news shocks, where the impact of the shock diﬀers
across sectors.
For the baseline model with a rationality cost of 50% of the mean squared
forecast error under sticky information, we analyze the relation between the
time-varying share of rational agents and the time-varying variance in the
variable to be forecasted. The time-varying volatility of inﬂation or output
is deﬁned as a ﬁve-month moving-average of their variance.
< Table 3 here >




to the level and variance of all endogenous macroeconomic variables of our
model. We ﬁnd that the share of agents with rational expectations is pos-
itively correlated with the variance of the variable forecasted, while corre-
lations with the level of the forecasted variable are low. This suggests that
agents choose to be more attentive with respect to inﬂation and output,
as volatility, and hence uncertainty, with respect to the variable increases.
Conversely, if inﬂation and output are relatively stable, agents can aﬀord to
ignore new information, since losses from forecasting with outdated informa-
tion will be low.
The share of rational output expectations λ
y
t does not seem to be signif-
icantly correlated with any macroeconomic variable other than the variance
in output. Conversely, the share of rational inﬂation expectations λπ
t is also
correlated to the monetary policy stance: In addition to the variance of the
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inﬂation rate, the variance of the nominal interest rate seems to play an im-
portant role, suggesting that more agents choose to pay the cost for rational
inﬂation expectations as monetary policy becomes more active.
Our results provide a link between models of near-rationality by, e.g.,
Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and Akerlof et al. (2000), and models of sticky
information: With near-rationality, it is assumed that agents will ignore a
fraction of inﬂation as they set wages (and prices) as long as inﬂation remains
below a certain treshold, resulting in a long-run trade-oﬀ between inﬂation
and output. However, near-rational models take the threshold of inﬂation
to be given and do not give any microfoundations with regard to agents’
behavior when not forming rational expectations. By contrast, in our model
agents are optimizing in the sense that they choose the optimal expectations
formation process each period. Furthermore, we model expectations under
sticky information explicitly as the alternative to rational expectations.
4.4 The Role of Monetary Policy
In this section, we analyze monetary policy under endogenous sticky infor-
mation. Speciﬁcally, determinacy and optimal monetary policy are evaluated
across a range of reaction coeﬃcients µπ and µygap.
Since in the limit all agents are assumed to have rational expectations,
the well-known eigenvalue accounting method developed by Blanchard and
Kahn (1980) can be used to evaluate determinacy also in our model with
heterogeneous expectations. We solve the model with six endogenous vari-
ables numerically, using the baseline calibration given above for Taylor-rule
coeﬃcients on inﬂation and the output gap ranging between zero and two:14
0 ≤ µπ ≤ 2 and 0 ≤ µygap ≤ 2.
In contrast to standard determinacy results for DSGE models, found e.g.
in Woodford (2003), we ﬁnd that stability of our model depends only on µπ:
As long as the Taylor principle is fulﬁlled and the central bank reacts more
14The upper-bound value of two for µπ and µygap is chosen somewhat ad hoc. It seems
to be a reasonable boundary, however, as it gives equal weights to the regions below and
above the Taylor principle of µπ ≥ 1. Furthermore, our results are robust to extending
the upper bound to higher values.
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than one-to-one to an increase in the inﬂation rate, the model will have a
unique and stable solution. We thus ﬁnd no long-run trade-oﬀ between in-
ﬂation and the output gap. This result has been conﬁrmed analytically by
Meyer-Gohde (2009b) for a DSGE model with a sticky information Phillips
curve and is due to the assumption that in the inﬁnite horizon, the model con-
verges to the perfect foresight model with a vertical long-run Phillips curve.
As a result, the Taylor principle becomes a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for determinacy. Only at µπ ≡ 1, stability of the model is established by the
coeﬃcient on the output gap µygap, however, no clear pattern emerges. Our
result regarding determinacy is robust across all values of 0 < λy,π < 1. By
contrast, Branch and McGough (2009) ﬁnd for a DSGE with heterogeneous
expectations that the share of non-rational expectations inﬂuences stability,
either positively if non-rational expectations are adaptive, or negatively if
non-rational expectations are extrapolative.
Next, we analyze optimal monetary policy for all values of µπ and µygap
that lead to a stable equilibrium, i.e. 1 < µπ ≤ 2 and 0 ≤ µygap ≤ 2.15 Figure
5 shows standard deviations of inﬂation, output and the interest rate across
values of µπ and µygap, where we simulated the model 1000 times over 1000
periods to gain robust results.
< Figure 5 here >
Regarding the central bank’s attentiveness towards inﬂation, the well-
known short-run trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and output emerges:16 Increas-
ing the reaction coeﬃcient to inﬂation in the Taylor rule, µπ, will stabilize
inﬂation at the cost of increasing variability in output. However, in abso-
lute terms our model suggests that the increase in the standard deviation of
output is almost ﬁve times the decrease in the standard deviation of inﬂa-
tion. Also, variability in nominal interest rates increases with rising µπ as
monetary policy needs to react more forcefully to changes in inﬂation.
15Simulation results were obtained with starting values of λ
y,π
t = 0.5. While one coeﬃ-
cient was varied, the other was set equal to its baseline calibration value.
16In a DSGE model with a sticky-information Phillips curve, the exact size of the short-
run trade-oﬀ in period 0 is π0 =
ψλ0
1−λ0(ˆ y0 − ˆ yn
0), see Meyer-Gohde (2009b).
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With respect to the central bank’s reaction coeﬃcient to the output gap,
µygap, a diﬀerent picture emerges: Varying the coeﬃcient between 0 ≤ µygap ≤
2 seems to have no clear eﬀect on the variability of inﬂation. By contrast,
output is stabilized considerably if the central bank reacts strongly to changes
in the output gap. Interestingly, variability of the nominal interest rate is
minimized at a value of µygap = 0.5, which is the value assumed in the
McCallum (2001) baseline calibration.
Overall, it seems that even though µygap is not important for determinacy
of the model, it is nevertheless relevant for a higher welfare in terms of less
output variability. While µπ > 1 can only marginally reduce variability of
inﬂation, output can be stabilized considerably by both keeping µygap rela-
tively high and µπ relatively low (providing the Taylor principle is fulﬁlled).
This ﬁnding is in line with De Grauwe (2008), who reports that the central
bank can to some extent stabilize both inﬂation and output relative to the
case with strict inﬂation targeting.
< Figure 6 here >
< Figure 7 here >
Finally, we compare impulse-responses obtained with the lower- and upper-
bound values of µπ and µygap, setting the other parameter to its baseline
calibration value, respectively. From Figure 6 we see that a higher coeﬃcient
on inﬂation in the Taylor rule will stabilize both output and inﬂation after
a monetary policy shock, while the hump-shaped response of inﬂation is re-
tained. However, this eﬀect comes at the cost of a more severe recession in
output after a cost-push shock, as interest rates are forced to increase more
forcefully after a shock to inﬂation occurs. Hence, the short-run trade-oﬀ
between stabilizing inﬂation and stabilizing output, analyzed, e.g. by Geiger
and Sauter (2009), becomes evident also in our model with endogenous sticky
information.
Comparing impulse responses with µygap = 0.01 and µygap = 2 in Figure
7, again inﬂation and output are stabilized considerably in response to a
monetary policy shock, if the central bank responds with a higher coeﬃcient
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to changes in the output gap. In contrast to the result in Figure 6, the
recession in output after a cost-push shock is also mitigated with a higher
µygap in the Taylor rule, conﬁrming our welfare result from Figure 5. However,
a stronger reaction of the central bank to the output gap leads to a more
pronounced increase of the nominal interest rate after a positive demand
shock, causing output to undershoot so that a recession occurs after the
shock. Hence, a high reaction coeﬃcient on the output gap in the Taylor rule
seems well suited to stabilize output and reduce recessions after a positive
cost-push shock to inﬂation, but may cause a small recession after a positive
demand shock due to an overly strong increase of the nominal interest rate.
5 Conclusion
We present a sticky information DSGE model where agents can choose each
period between rational expectations and expectations under sticky informa-
tion: Assuming that all agents know the relevant model, rational expectations
produce perfect forecasts, but the new information set can only be obtained
at a positive cost, the rationality cost. By contrast, outdated information un-
der sticky information reaches agents freely, but may lead to biased forecasts.
Employing a switching mechanism by Brock and Hommes (1997), we thus
derive a sticky information DSGE where the share of agents with rational
expectations is endogenous and time-varying.
Results from numerical simulation suggest that the share of agents with
rational expectations varies between zero and one if the rationality cost cor-
responds to at least 50% of the mean squared forecast error under sticky
information. However, even at zero costs, agents switch between forecasting
rules as shocks hit the economy, emphasizing the relevance of a time-varying
λt.
An important result of our model is the link it provides between models
of sticky information and models of near-rationality à la Akerlof and Yellen
(1985) and Akerlof et al. (2000): We ﬁnd that the share of rational expecta-
tions is positively correlated with the variance of the variable to be forecasted.
Hence, as in the models with near-rationality, agents form rational expecta-
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tions if variability in the economy increases and can aﬀord to use outdated
information if variables remain relatively stable. The relevance of monetary
policy for inﬂation expectactions is highlighted by the result that the share
of agents with rational inﬂation expectations is additionally positively corre-
lated with the variance of the interest rate. Hence, a more active monetary
policy is interpreted as a signal to pay closer attention to inﬂation. This cor-
responds to our ﬁnding that in general agents are more rational with respect
to output than with respect to inﬂation expectations and thus rely on the
central bank to maintain a stable inﬂation rate.
Our model with endogenous λt preserves important results of the sticky
information models in Mankiw and Reis (2002, 2007): We ﬁnd that inﬂation
has a hump-shaped response to a monetary policy shock, implying that the
maximum impact of the shock occurs with a delay of some periods. This
result is obtained even though we do not assume any autocorrelation in the
shocks. Furthermore, we can conﬁrm the ﬁnding by Meyer-Gohde (2009b)
that determinacy in sticky information models depends only on the Taylor
rule coeﬃcient of inﬂation and the model has a unique and stable equilib-
rium as long as the Taylor principle is fulﬁlled. With regard to the high
persistence in simulated series for inﬂation and output, we can only repro-
duce results of Mankiw and Reis (2002, 2007) if we assume autocorrelated
shocks like in Mankiw and Reis (2007). Hence, sticky information does not
suﬃce to generate the degree of intertia observed empirically. Nevertheless,
the persistence of simulated variables generally increases as the rationality
cost rises and more agents choose sticky information.
Analyzing optimal monetary policy in our DSGE with endogenous sticky
information, we ﬁnd that although the Taylor principle is a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for determinacy, welfare analysis shows that the central
bank should also target the output gap: Output is stabilized best with a high
coeﬃcient on the output gap in the Taylor rule, which does not aﬀect the
inﬂation rate negatively. As long as the Taylor principle is fulﬁlled, varying
the coeﬃcients in the Taylor rule has only marginal eﬀects on inﬂation stabil-
ity, but increasing (decreasing) µygap (µπ) will stabilize output. Furthermore,
a stronger reaction of monetary policy to inﬂation will reduce the eﬀect of
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a monetary shock on inﬂation (and, to a smaller degree, also output), but
increases the recession after a cost-push shock to inﬂation. By contrast, a
higher coeﬃcient on the output gap will stabilize both output and inﬂation
after monetary policy shocks and reduces the negative response of output
after a cost-push shock. We thus conclude that optimal monetary policy
should react more than one-to-one to changes in inﬂation, but nevertheless
should not put too much weight on inﬂation relative to the output gap due to
the short-run trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and the output gap. Thus, in terms
of welfare our model suggests a role for output targeting in addition to an
inﬂation target. Nonetheless, stabilizing inﬂation remains an important task
for monetary policy, due to the strong link between heterogeneity in inﬂation
expectations and monetary policy actions in our model.
Notwithstanding our results, there may exist further reasons for a rela-
tively high coeﬃcient on inﬂation in the Taylor rule, such as the prevention
of time-inconsistency of monetary policy due to insuﬃcient commitment,
causing an inﬂationary bias. Here, we assume that the central bank always
follows the mechanism given by the Taylor rule, such that problems of time-
inconsistency cannot arise. Nevertheless, the analysis of our model under
commitment and discretion of monetary policy would be an interesting as-
pect, which we leave for further research.
While to the best of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst approach allowing
agents to choose between rational and sticky information expectations, this
paper stands in the tradition of models with heterogeneous expectations,
where agents generally choose between rational and non-rational expecta-
tions: For instance, De Grauwe (2008) ﬁnds that a fraction of agents fore-
casting with simple heuristic may cause endogenous inertia in inﬂation and
output and that the central bank can reduce variability in both inﬂation and
output when it targets output in addition to inﬂation. Similarly, Brazier
et al. (2008) and Branch and Evans (2006, 2007, 2009) in their models with
heterogeneous expectations also report a strong link between heterogeneous
inﬂation expectations and monetary policy in the sense that heterogeneity
in expectations may cause endogenous volatility in inﬂation, which in turn
is mitigated once monetary policy targets inﬂation. However, a trade-oﬀ
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between inﬂation and output targeting is generally not analyzed in these
models. In line with these models, we also ﬁnd that the shares of rational
agents react to changes in the volatility of the series forecasted. However, we
are not able to reproduce feedback eﬀects from the switching of forecasting
rules to the model variables, since the switching mechanism operates after
the model solution is found. An interesting avenue for future research would
be to incorporate the switching mechanism into the solution algorithm by
Meyer-Gohde (2009a), accounting for the inﬁnite sum of past expectations
present in the sticky information expectations operator.
6 Appendix
6.1 Mathematical Appendix
6.1.1 Optimal Aggregate Consumption
In order to derive optimal aggregate consumption from individual Euler equa-
tions, iterate (5) forward to get:























(ˆ it+k − πt+k+1) (29)
Aggregating across agents then gives:
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e Et(ˆ it − πt+1), (30)
where e Et = λtERE
t + (1 − λt)ESI
t = λtEt + (1 − λt)λ
P∞
j=0 (1 − λ)jEt−1−j.
6.1.2 Sticky Information Phillips Curve
Following Ball et al. (2005), the sticky information Phillips curve is derived
as follows: Under ﬂexible prices and full information, ﬁrms set relative prices











Also, the deﬁnition of real marginal costs and households’ optimal deci-
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Substituting this expression into (31) and assuming market clearing as well



























ˆ zt + et, (34)
where again variables with a hat denote deviations from steady state and
et is an i.i.d. shock that can be interpreted as a cost-push shock resulting,
for instance, from wage or tax changes. Now, assuming fully competitive
markets with complete information, where all ﬁrms set ˆ p∗
t,i = ˆ pt, we get for








Solving (35) for ˆ zt and substituting into (34) then gives the deviation of
ﬁrm i’s optimal price from its steady state in terms of the aggregate price
level and the output gap:
ˆ p
∗
t,i = ˆ pt +
σ + η
1 + ηθ
(ˆ yt − ˆ y
n
t ) + et (36)
Accounting for the role of expectations under limited information derived
in (14), we then get for the aggregate price index:
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ˆ pt = λtE
RE
t [ˆ pt + ψ (ˆ yt − ˆ y
n
t ) + et] + (1 − λt)E
SI
t [ˆ pt + ψ (ˆ yt − ˆ y
n
t ) + et]
= e Et [ˆ pt + ψ (ˆ yt − ˆ y
n
t ) + et] (37)
where ψ =
σ+η
1+ηθ. Finally, we lag equation (37) by one period and subtract
it from (37), setting λt = λ. After some algebra, we arrive at the sticky-
information Phillips curve as in Ball et al. (2005):
ˆ pt − ˆ pt−1 = e Et [ˆ pt + ψ (ˆ yt − ˆ y
n
t ) + et] − e Et−1
￿
ˆ pt−1 + ψ
￿






πt = λ(ˆ pt + ψ(ˆ yt − ˆ y
n




j+1Et−1−j [ˆ pt + ψ(ˆ yt − ˆ y
n







ˆ pt−1 + ψ
￿






πt = λ(ˆ pt + ψ(ˆ yt − ˆ y
n




(ψ(ˆ yt − ˆ y
n





jEt−1−j [πt + ψ∆(ˆ yt − ˆ y
n














jEt−1−j [πt + ψ∆(ˆ yt − ˆ y
n
t ) + ∆et]
(38)
6.1.3 The Switching Mechanism
Recursive solutions to the inﬁnite sums of past squared forecast errors are
derived as follows:
















k(ˆ xt−k − Et−k−1ˆ xt−k)
2 + K
RE￿









Lagging equation (39) by one period gives:
U
RE


















k+1(ˆ xt−k−1 − Et−k−2ˆ xt−k−1)
2 + K
RE￿
− (1 − ρ)
￿







t−1 − (1 − ρ)
￿





t apply in the same manner.
6.2 Figures
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses to a Demand Shock







Impulse Responses to a Shock in IS




































Figure 2: Impulse Responses to a Cost-Push Shock









Impulse Responses to a Shock in PC





































Figure 3: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock











Impulse Responses to a Shock in MP




































Figure 4: Impulse Responses to a Technology Shock










Impulse Responses to a Shock in TECH



























































Figure 5: Optimal Policy across Taylor-Rule Coeﬃcients
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Reaction Coefficient Output Gap
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Figure 6: Impulse-Responses with Varying Reaction Coeﬃcients to Inﬂation















































Interest Rate IS Shock






Interest Rate PC Shock






































Figure 7: Impulse-Responses with Varying Reaction Coeﬃcients to the Output Gap
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Table 1: Statistics of Simulated Variables
Variable Standard Deviation AR(1) coeﬃcient


















Note: Values are obtained from simulating the model
1000 times over 1000 periods.
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Table 2: Distribution of the Shares of Rational Agents




t K=0% 0.6667 1 0.9935 0.0414 9.403
K=10% 0.2152 1 0.9578 0.1216 7.241
K=25% 0.0052 1 0.8085 0.3232 5.782
K=50% 0.0000 1 0.4842 0.4651 2.974
K=75% 0.0000 1 0.2506 0.4223 4.690
K=100% 0.0000 1 0.1229 0.3119 10.789
λπ
t K=0% 0.5084 1 0.9931 0.0390 8.709
K=10% 0.1008 1 0.9421 0.1414 8.438
K=25% 0.0011 1 0.7283 0.4159 5.260
K=50% 0.0000 1 0.3439 0.4607 4.132
K=75% 0.0000 1 0.1339 0.3250 8.046
K=100% 0.0000 1 0.0486 0.2038 21.390
Note: The mean is obtained from simulating the model 1000 times over
1000 periods. The average switching frequency is calculated in quarters.





level πt -0.0302 -0.0499
variance πt 0.0369 0.3958
level yt 0.0805 0.0245
variance yt 0.3339 -0.1015
level it -0.1012 -0.0332
variance it 0.0477 0.2512
Simulated with KRE = 50%.
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Table A1: Parameter Values for Calibration
Parameters Baseline Model:
McCallum (2001)
intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/σ 0.4
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion σ 2.5
Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labour supply η 1
elasticity of substitution between goods θ 35
coeﬃcient on output gap from PC ψ =
σ+η
1+ηθ 0.097
weight of inﬂation target Taylor rule µπ 1.5
weight of output Taylor rule µygap 0.5
interest smoothing Taylor rule µi 0.8
AR term technology shock α4 0.950
std IS shock τ1 0.030
std PC shock τ2 0.030
std MP shock τ3 0.0017
std technology shock τ4 0.007
Calibration of switching parameters:
initial share of rational output expectations λy 0.5
initial share of rational inﬂation expectations λπ 0.5
intensity of choice (Brock/Hommes 1997) γ 10000
memory of past forecast errors (De Grauwe 2008) ρ 0.5
Table A2: Costs of Rationality









Note: Mean values are generated from a simulation
of the baseline model over 1000 periods with
ρ = 0 and KRE = 0.
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